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ABSTRACT
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we ﬁrst document that the recent increase in
income inequality in the United States has not been accompanied by a corresponding rise in con-
sumption inequality. Much of this divergence is due to diﬀerent trends in within-group inequality,
which has increased signiﬁcantly for income but little for consumption. We then develop a simple
framework that allows us to analytically characterize how within-group income inequality aﬀects
consumption inequality in a world in which agents can trade a full set of contingent consumption
claims, subject to endogenous constraints emanating from the limited enforcement of intertemporal
contracts (as in Kehoe and Levine, 1993). Finally, we quantitatively evaluate, in the context of
a calibrated general equilibrium production economy, whether this setup, or alternatively a stan-
dard incomplete markets model (as in Aiyagari, 1994), can account for the documented stylized
consumption inequality facts from the U.S. data.
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for outstanding research assistance. Krueger gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the National
Science Foundation under grant SES-0004376. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The sharp increase in earnings and income inequality for the United States in the last 25 years
is a well-documented fact. Many authors have found that the dispersions of U.S. household
earnings and incomes have a strong upward trend, attributable to increases in the dispersion of
the permanent component of income as well as to an increase in the volatility of the transitory
component of income.1 If one is interested in the welfare impact of these changes, however, the
distribution of current income might not be a suﬃcient statistic. Since a signiﬁcant fraction of
variations of income appear to be due to variations in its transitory component, current income
may not be the appropriate measure of lifetime resources available to agents; and thus the dis-
tribution of current income might not be a good measure of how economic welfare is allocated
among households in the United States.2 Moreover, the same change in current or permanent
income inequality might have a very diﬀerent impact on the welfare distribution, depending on
the structure of credit and insurance markets available to agents for smoothing income ﬂuctua-
tions. For these reasons, several authors have moved beyond income and earnings as indicators
of well-being and have studied the distribution of individual or household consumption.C o n -
tributors include Cutler and Katz (1991a,b), Johnson and Shipp (1991), Johnson and Smeeding
(1998), Mayer and Jencks (1993), Slesnick (1993, 2001), Deaton and Paxson (1994), Dynarski
and Gruber (1997), Blundell and Preston (1998), and Krueger and Perri (2004).
Our paper follows this line of research and aims at making three contributions, one empir-
ical, one theoretical, and one quantitative in nature. On the empirical side it investigates how
the cross-sectional income and consumption distribution in the United States developed over
the period 1980—2003. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the paper extends
and complements the studies mentioned above. Our main ﬁnding is that despite the surge in
income inequality in the United States in the last quarter century, consumption inequality has
increased only moderately. In particular, income inequality has increased substantially both
between and within groups of households with the same characteristics (such as education, sex,
and race), but even though between-group consumption inequality has tracked between-group
1See, e.g., Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), or Katz and Autor (1999) for
recent surveys of these empirical ﬁndings.
2Blundell and Preston (1998) provide theoretical conditions under which the cross-sectional distribution of
current consumption is a suﬃcient statistic for the cross-sectional distribution of welfare.
1income inequality quite closely, within-group consumption inequality has increased much less
than within-group income inequality.
Second, we propose a theoretical explanation for these stylized facts. Our hypothesis is that
an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic labor income (which we identify as the increase
in within-group inequality) not only has been an important factor in the increase in income
inequality, but also has caused a change in the development of ﬁnancial markets, allowing indi-
vidual households to better insure against these (now bigger) idiosyncratic income ﬂuctuations.
We present a simple model with endogenous debt constraints (henceforth referred to as the debt
constraint markets (DCM) model), building on earlier work by Alvarez and Jermann (2000),
Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001), and Kocherlakota (1996), that allows us to analytically charac-
terize the relationship between within-group income and consumption inequality. In the model
agents enter risk-sharing contracts, but at any point in time have the option to renege on their
obligations, at the cost of losing their assets and being excluded from future risk sharing. Our
main result is that an increase in the volatility of income, keeping the persistence of the income
process constant, always leads to a smaller increase in consumption inequality within the group
that shares income risk, unless there is no capital income in the economy. The nondegenerate
range of income dispersion is such that an increase in income volatility leads to a decline in
consumption inequality. Intuitively, we know that higher income volatility increases the value
of risk-sharing opportunities and therefore reduces the incentives to default. As a consequence,
more risk sharing is possible and the consumption distribution fans out less than the income dis-
tribution (and may even “fan in”). This model captures, in a simple and analytically tractable
way, the idea that the structure of the credit markets in an economy is endogenous and that,
in response to higher income volatility, credit markets have more value and thus will tend to
deepen.3
Finally, we assess whether an extension of this simple model is quantitatively consistent with
the stylized facts established in the empirical section of the paper. We develop a production
economy with capital and a large number of agents that face a stochastic labor income process.
3The endogenous response of credit markets to income risk has interesting policy implications. In Krueger
and Perri (1999) we show that in the DCM model public insurance (unemployment insurance, progressive taxes,
etc.) may crowd out private insurance, possibly more than one-for-one. Empirical studies by Cutler and Gruber
(1996) and Albarran and Attanasio (2003) ﬁnd a sizeable crowding-out eﬀect of public insurance programs.
2We choose this income process to match the level and trend of income inequality, both between
and within diﬀerent groups. In particular, we also allow for changes in income inequality that
are not due to changes in income volatility. The extent to which agents can borrow to insulate
consumption from idiosyncratic income ﬂuctuations is derived endogenously. It is a function
of the volatility of the stochastic income process, which, as before in the simple model, aﬀects
the incentives to repay loans by determining how valuable future access to credit markets is.
Our model, for a given time series of cross-sectional income distributions, produces a time series
of cross-sectional between- and within-group consumption distributions. We also evaluate the
quantitative implications for within- and between-group consumption inequality of a standard
incomplete markets model (henceforth referred to as the SIM model) along the lines of Aiyagari
(1994). We ﬁnd that the DCM model slightly understates the increase in consumption inequality
and the SIM model somewhat overstates that increase, relative to the data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we document our main stylized facts. Section
3 presents the simple model, and Section 4 lays out the economy we use for the quantitative
analysis. Section 5 describes our quantitative experiment and parameter choices, and Section
6 presents and discusses the results. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains more details
about the data and Appendix B more details about computational issues.
2 Trends in Income and Consumption Inequality
In this section we document how income and consumption inequality have evolved in the United
States during the last 25 years. For this purpose we use the Consumer Expenditure (CE)
Interview Survey, which is the only micro-level data set for the United States that reports
comprehensive measures of consumption expenditures and earnings for a repeated large cross
section of households.4
2.1 The Consumer Expenditure Survey
The CE Interview Survey is a rotating panel of households that are selected to be representative
of the U.S. population. It started in 1960, but continuous data are available only from the
4The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) reports both income and consumption data. The consumption
data, however, contain only food consumption and therefore are of limited use for our analysis.
3ﬁrst quarter of 1980 until the ﬁrst quarter of 2004. Each quarter the survey contains detailed
information on quarterly consumption expenditures for all households interviewed during that
quarter. After a ﬁrst preliminary interview, each household is interviewed for a maximum of four
consecutive times. In the second and ﬁfth interviews, household members are asked questions
about earnings, other sources of income, hours worked, and taxes paid for the past year.
2.2 Income and Consumption
Our measure of income is meant to capture all sources of household revenues that are exogenous
(to a large extent) to the consumption and saving decisions of households (which are endogenous
in our models). Therefore we deﬁne income as labor earnings after taxes plus transfers (from now
on, LEA+ income). We measure after-tax labor earnings as the sum of wages and salaries of all
household members, plus a ﬁxed fraction of self-employment farm and nonfarm income,5 minus
reported federal, state, and local taxes (net of refunds) and Social Security contributions. We
then add reported government transfers (unemployment insurance, food stamps, and welfare).
Our measure of consumption is meant to capture the ﬂow of consumption services that
accrue to a household in a given period. For nondurable or small semidurable goods as well as
services, expenditures are a good approximation for that ﬂow. For large durable goods such as
cars and houses, the relation between current expenditures and consumption service ﬂows is less
direct. Thus we impute service ﬂows from the (value of the) stock of durables of a household.
Our measure of service ﬂows from housing is the rent paid by the households who indeed rent
their home and the self-reported (by the CE respondent) hypothetical rent by the households
who own. Our measure of service ﬂo w so fc a r si saﬁx e df r a c t i o n( 1 / 3 2 )o ft h ev a l u eo ft h e
stock of vehicles owned by the household. Since we do not have direct information on the
value of the stock of cars, we follow closely the procedure used by Cutler and Katz (1991a) and
use information from households who currently purchase vehicles (and for which we therefore
observe the value of the purchase) to impute the value of the stock of vehicles for all households.
Our benchmark measure of a household’s consumption is then the sum of expenditures on
nondurables, services, and small durables (such as household equipment), plus imputed services
from housing and vehicles. Each expenditure component is deﬂated by expenditure-speciﬁc,
5The exact fraction is 0.864 and is taken from Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (1996).
4quarter-speciﬁc consumer price indexes (CPIs). From now on we label this benchmark measure
ND+ consumption.6
As we are interested in the distribution of resources per capita, before computing inequality
measures we divide household income and consumption by the number of adult equivalents in
the household using the census equivalence scale (see Dalaker and Naifeh, 1998).
2.3 Sample Selection
Our objective is to characterize the link between labor income and consumption inequality.
T h e r e f o r ew ew a n tt os e l e c tab e n c h m a r ks a m p l eo fh o u s e h o l d sf o rw h i c hw eh a v er e l i a b l ed a t a
for both labor income and consumption for the same time interval. To do so we restrict our
sample to households that are complete income respondents and interviewed four times.7 For
these households, income measured in the ﬁfth interview and the sum of consumption ﬁgures
reported in the second through the ﬁfth interviews are our measures of their yearly income
and consumption. For comparability with previous inequality studies, we performed additional
sample selections, such as excluding elderly households, rural households, and households whose
reference person reports an implausibly low real wage.8
In Table A2 in the appendix we report the benchmark sample sizes for every year in the
period 1980—2003, along with weighted averages for income and consumption. Note that the
data display no growth of expenditures on nondurables over time, as Slesnick (2001) already
highlights. This is puzzling since aggregate nondurable consumption expenditures from the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) show signiﬁcant growth (see again Slesnick, 2001).
This might be a signal for growing underreporting of nondurable consumption expenditures in
the CE. Also note, however, that ND+ consumption includes services from durables which, on
average, are almost as large as expenditures on nondurables (see again Table A2) and display
a growth trend over time that matches up better with NIPA data. So if underreporting of
consumption exists, it is likely to be less severe for our benchmark ND+ consumption measure
than for the more commonly used nondurable consumption expenditures.
6In Appendix A we provide a detailed description of all the items included in our consumption measures and
of our imputation and deﬂation procedures.
7The CE classiﬁes as incomplete income respondents those households who report zero income for all the major
income categories, suggesting nonreliability of their earning ﬁgures (see also Nelson, 1994).
8See Appendix A for a precise list of our sample restrictions.
52.4 Inequality Trends
Figure 1 displays the trend for four commonly used measures of cross-sectional inequality, com-
puted on the benchmark sample and on the measures of income and consumption described
above. All measures are computed using CE population weights. We report the Gini coeﬃ-
cient, the variance of the logs, and the 90/10 and 50/10 ratios. In each panel the dashed line
represents inequality in LEA+ income and the solid line represents inequality in ND+ consump-
tion. Finally the thin dash-dotted lines are standard errors of the inequality measures, which
we computed by performing a bootstrap procedure with 100 repetitions.
Figure 1 conﬁrms the well-known fact that labor income inequality in the United States has
increased signiﬁcantly in the last quarter century: the Gini index has risen from around 0.3 to
around 0.37, and the variance of the logs displays an increase of more than 20%. The 90/10
ratio for income surges from around 4.2 to over 6, suggesting a large divergence between the two
tails of the income distribution over time. Finally the 50/10 ratio displays an increase from 2.2
to about 2.7, revealing that households in the bottom tail of the income distribution have lost
ground relative to the median.9
The ﬁgure also presents our main empirical ﬁnding, namely that the increase in consumption
inequality has been much less marked;10 the increase has been from 0.23 to 0.26 for the Gini
and about 5% in the variance of logs. The 90/10 ratio has increased from 2.9 to around 3.4,
suggesting a much more moderate fanning out of the consumption distribution.11 Finally, the
50/10 ratio increases only from about 1.7 to 1.9, suggesting that in terms of consumption,
households in the bottom part of the distribution have lost less ground relative to the median.12
Note that our income deﬁnition includes government taxes and transfers, so that changes
in government income redistribution policies cannot be responsible for the divergence between
the two series. Although the evolution of consumption inequality has been studied less than
9Increases of similar magnitude are found in other cross-sectional data sets. Krueger and Perri (2004) compare
the increase in wage inequality using CE data with that obtained by using PSID data (from Heathcote et al.,
2004) and the increase measured by using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data (from Katz and Autor,
1999) and ﬁnd that, for the same sample selection, the magnitude of the increase is very similar. This suggests
that the quality of the CE earnings/wage data is comparable to those of other cross-sectional data sets.
10Pendakur (1998) ﬁnds similar results for Canada for 1978—1992 and his preferred measure of consumption.
11One nice property of the 90/10 ratios is that they are not sensitive to changes in top-coding thresholds. The
divergence of the 90/10 ratios in income and consumption thus suggests that changes in top-coding thresholds
play no important role in explaining the measured divergence in inequality.
12These ﬁndings are consistent with those of Slesnick (2001), who found that poverty rates for income increased
from 11.1% in 1973 to 13.8% in 1995, while poverty rates for consumption declined from 9.9% to 9.5%.
6the evolution of income inequality, some authors (Cutler and Katz, 1991a,b, and Johnson and
Shipp, 1991) have noted that the sharp increase in income inequality of the early 1980s has been
accompanied by an increase in consumption inequality. Our measures also display an increase
in consumption inequality in the early 1980s, but as noted by Slesnick (2001), it is less marked
than the increase in income inequality; moreover, in the 1990s income inequality has continued
to rise (although at a slower pace) while consumption inequality has remained substantially
ﬂat. This last fact has also been reported by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan (1998)
in his introductory remarks to a symposium on income inequality. Attanasio et al. (2005)
have recently looked at consumption distributions using the CE Diary Survey, which surveys a
diﬀerent group of households and collects information on consumption of small items frequently
purchased, such as food and personal care items. They ﬁnd that for comparable categories in
the Diary and Interview Surveys, mean per capita consumption is very similar but consumption
i n e q u a l i t yg r o w sm o r ei nt h eD i a r yS u r v e y . B a s e do nt h i sﬁnding, they construct a measure
of the variance of logs of nondurable consumption that uses information from both the Diary
and the Interview Surveys and ﬁnd that it increases about 4.6% over the period 1986—2000.
By contrast our measure, based solely on the Interview Survey, displays an increase of about
2.5%. These increases in inequality are diﬀerent, but they are both signiﬁcantly smaller than
t h ei n c r e a s ei nv a r i a n c eo fl o gi n c o m e( w h i c ho v e rt h es a m ep e r i o dw a so v e r1 2 % ) .M o r e o v e r ,w e
conjecture that, due to its limited consumption coverage, the impact of using the Diary Survey
is likely to be even smaller if one focuses on a broader deﬁnition of consumption such as our
benchmark ND+ consumption. In the next subsection we check the robustness of the trends just
described to alternative deﬁnitions of consumption and to alternative sample selection choices.
2.5 Alternative Deﬁnitions and Samples
Panel (a) of Table 1 reports the increase in consumption inequality (measured as the variance
of logs) from the ﬁrst two years of our sample (1980—1981) to the last two (2002—2003) obtained
for deﬁnitions of consumption expenditures. As a reference point, in the ﬁrst two columns we
again report the increase in inequality for our benchmark measures of income (LEA+) and
7consumption (ND+).13 The third and fourth columns report the increase in inequality in food
consumption and nondurable consumption (the deﬁnition of consumption used by Attanasio and
Davis, 1996, among others). For these deﬁnitions of consumption, the increase in inequality is
slightly smaller than for our benchmark consumption (ND+) measure. Finally, the last column
of panel (a) reports the change in inequality for total consumption expenditures (TCE). For
this deﬁnition the increase in consumption inequality is larger, although still less than half of
the increase in income inequality. One should keep in mind, however, that this consumption
measure includes cash payments for homes and vehicles, and therefore contains a signiﬁcant part
of households’ savings, which biases measured consumption inequality toward measured income
inequality. In addition, this measure, being based on expenditures on durables rather than on
service ﬂows from these durables, is aﬀected by changes in the frequency of durables purchases
over time. For these reasons we think of the latter statistic as an upper bound for the true
change in consumption inequality rather than as the best estimate of it.
Table 1. Changes in inequality
(a) Alternative deﬁnitions
Income Consumption
LEA+ ND+ Food ND TCE
Change in var. log 21.4% 5.3% 2.3% 3.3% 10.4%
(b) Alternative samples
Benchmark Quarterly Inc. Rural Inc. Low Wages
Change in var. log ND+ 5.3% 6.3% 4.5% 5.5%
Change in var. log LEA+ 21.4% 22.0% 20.5% 27.5%
Panel (b) of Table 1 reports the increase in LEA+ income and ND+ consumption inequality
as computed using diﬀerent sample selections. The ﬁrst column contains the results for our
benchmark sample. In the second column we report inequality measures computed by using
quarterly (as opposed to yearly) consumption measures. These numbers also use information
from households that are interviewed in the CE less than four times, thus increasing the sample
13In the remainder of the paper we focus on the variance of logs as our main measure of inequality. Therefore,
in Table 1 we restrict attention to this measure. Using other measures of inequality yields similar results.
8size signiﬁcantly.14 It has the disadvantage, however, that for any given household, income
and consumption information do not refer to the same period. The third and fourth columns
report measures for samples that include rural households and households with a reference
person reporting a very low wage. We observe that with all sample selection criteria employed,
the increase in consumption inequality is quite similar and much smaller than the increase in
income inequality.15
2.6 Between- and Within-Group Income and Consumption Inequality Trends
Before turning to the theoretical explanation for the empirical ﬁndings, we further investigate
the nature of the change in income and consumption inequality by decomposing them into
between- and within-group inequality. Between-group inequality is attributable to ﬁxed (and
observable) characteristics of the household (for example, education, experience, and sex). Al-
though between-group inequality changes over time (returns to these characteristics can change
over time, as in the case of the increase in the college premium), it is unlikely that households
can insure against these changes; thus, increases in between-group inequality should translate
into similar increases in between-group consumption inequality.
Within-group income inequality is a residual measure that also includes inequality caused
by idiosyncratic income shocks. Therefore, increases in within-group income inequality are (at
least partly) attributable to an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic income shocks. In the
models discussed in the next sections, the main question is how well households can insulate
their consumption from an increase in the volatility of these idiosyncratic income shocks. The
better households can insure against these shocks the less we expect within-group consumption
inequality to increase in response to an increase in within-group income inequality. Therefore, we
now empirically measure the changes in both within-group income and consumption inequality.
The empirical decomposition we employ is simple and commonly used. Following Katz and
Autor (1999), for each labor income and consumption expenditure cross section (after control-
ling for age eﬀects), we regress income and consumption on the following characteristics of the
14Our benchmark sample has an average of 6,660 quarter/household data points per year, and the quarterly
sample has an average of 11,300 quarter/household data points per year.
15We also experimented with per-household (as opposed to per-adult-equivalent) income and consumption
m e a s u r e sa n dw i t hd i ﬀerent equivalence scales. These changes aﬀect the level of inequality measures but have
very little eﬀect on the trends.
9reference person and the spouse (if present): sex, race, years of education, experience, interac-
tion terms between experience and education, dummies for managerial/professional occupation,
and region of residence. These characteristics explain about 25% of the cross-sectional varia-
tion of income and consumption in 1980. We denote the cross-sectional variance explained by
these characteristics as “between-group” inequality and the residual variance as “within-group”
inequality. By construction the two variances sum to the total variance.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of between-group (panel a) and within-group (panel b) inequal-
ity for income and consumption. As documented by many studies, for income both the between-
and within-group components display an increase. Panel (a) shows that for consumption, the
between-group component displays an increase similar in magnitude to that of income.16 Panel
(b) reveals a very diﬀerent picture for the within-group component: the increase in consumption
inequality is an order of magnitude smaller than the increase in income inequality. Consequently,
understanding the trends in panel (b) is crucial for understanding the patterns of income and
consumption inequality in the United States.
In the next section we present a simple model in which we analytically characterize the
relation between income and consumption inequality within a group of ex ante identical agents
and show how the endogenous expansion of risk sharing may lead to a small increase (or even a
decline) in within-group consumption inequality in the wake of increasing income inequality.
3 A Simple Model
We analyze a pure exchange economy similar to Kocherlakota (1996), Alvarez and Jermann
(2000), and Kehoe and Levine (2001). Time is discrete and the number of time periods is
inﬁnite. Each period has two (types of) agents i =1 ,2 and a single, nonstorable consumption
good. Agents obtain endowments of the consumption good from two sources: labor and capital
“income.” This distinction, although not necessary in the simple model, helps to explain our
quantitative results in the next section. First, an agent receives endowments in the form of
stochastic labor income. If one consumer has labor income 1+ε,t h eo t h e rh a s1−ε, so that the
16This ﬁnding is highly consistent with the results of Attanasio and Davis (1996), which suggest that changes
in relative wages between education groups are fully reﬂected in consumption changes of these groups. We will
revisit this point below in our model-based quantitative exercise.
10aggregate endowment from labor is constant at 2 in each period. Let st ∈ S = {1,2} denote the
consumer that has labor income 1+ε. We assume that {st}∞
t=0 is a sequence of i.i.d. random
variables with π(st =1 )=π(s2 =2 )=1
2, so that households are ex ante identical. Note that
the parameter ε ∈ [0,1) measures the variability of the income process.
In addition, two trees, one initially owned by each agent, each yield a constant endowment
of r per period. Thus, aggregate endowment from capital equals 2r, total endowment per period
is constant at 2(1 + r), and the capital share is given by r
1+r.
Let st =( s0,...,s t) denote an event history and π(st) the time 0 probability of event history









where β<1 and u is continuous, twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave on
(0,∞),a n ds a t i s ﬁes the Inada condition limc→0 u0(c)=∞. Let us deﬁne as







the continuation utility of agent i from allocation ci, from event history st onward, and denote
by e =( e1,e 2) the autarkic allocation of consuming the labor e n d o w m e n ti ne a c he v e n th i s t o r y .
In this economy both agents have an incentive to share their endowment risk. We assume,
however, that at any point in time both agents have the option of reneging on the risk-sharing
arrangement obligations and bearing the associated costs, speciﬁed as exclusion from intertem-
poral trade and loss of any tree in their possession. This implies that any risk-sharing mechanism
must yield allocations that deliver to each consumer a continuation utility at least as high as the
autarkic allocation, for all histories st. Formally, we impose the individual rationality constraints







We say that an allocation (c1,c 2) is constrained eﬃc i e n ti fi ts a t i s ﬁes the resource constraint
c1 + c2 =2 ( 1+r) (2)
11and the individual rationality constraints (1). Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show how constrained
eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized as competitive equilibria with state-dependent borrow-
ing constraints. Now we study the cross-sectional consumption distribution associated with a
constrained eﬃcient allocation; we are particularly interested in how this distribution changes
in response to an increase in income volatility, as measured by ε.
3.1 The Constrained Eﬃcient Consumption Distribution
We focus on symmetric allocations.17 In order to analyze how constrained eﬃcient consumption
allocations vary with ε, we now solve for the continuation value of autarky, which is given by
U(1 + ε)=( 1 − β)u(1 + ε)+
β
2
[u(1 + ε)+u(1 − ε)]
U(1 − ε)=( 1 − β)u(1 − ε)+
β
2
[u(1 + ε)+u(1 − ε)].
Here U(1 + ε) and U(1 − ε) denote the continuation utility of autarky for the agents with the
currently high income and the currently low income, respectively. The continuation utility from
autarky is a convex combination of utility obtained from consumption today, (1 − β)u(1 + ε)
or (1 − β)u(1 − ε), and the expected utility from tomorrow onward. The next lemma, whose
proof is straightforward and hence omitted, states properties of U(1+ε) a saf u n c t i o no fi n c o m e
variability ε. Deﬁne UFB(r)=u(1+r) as the lifetime utility of the ﬁrst best allocation in which
there is complete risk sharing and consumption of both agents is constant at 1+r.
Lemma 1 U(1+ε) is strictly increasing in ε at ε =0 , is strictly decreasing in ε as ε → 1, and
is strictly concave in ε, with a unique maximum ε1 =a r gm a x ε U(1 + ε) ∈ (0,1). Furthermore:
1. Either U(1 + ε1) ≤ UFB(r) or
2. U(1 + ε1) >U FB(r). In this case there exist ε(r) < 1 such that U(1 + ε(r)) = UFB(r).
The number ε(r) is strictly increasing in r. Furthermore, either there exists a number
¯ ε(r) ∈ (ε(r),1) such that U(1+¯ ε(r)) = UFB(r) and the number ¯ ε(r) is strictly decreasing
in r, or U(2) >U FB(r), in which case we take ¯ ε(r)=1 .
17Consider two histories s
t, ˜ s
t that satisfy, for all τ ≤ t,
sτ =1if and only if ˜ sτ =2 .






t) for all such histories s
t, ˜ s
t.
12The nonmonotonicity of U(1 + ε), s h o w ni nF i g u r e3 ,s t e m sf r o mt w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects. For
small ε the direct eﬀect of higher consumption today outweighs the higher risk faced by the
agent from tomorrow onward and U(1 + ε) increases with ε.A s ε becomes larger and future
consumption more risky, U(1 + ε) declines with ε as the risk eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect.
On the other hand, the value of autarky for the agent with currently low income, U(1 − ε), is
strictly decreasing (and concave) in ε (also plotted in Figure 3), since an increase in ε reduces
consumption today for this agent and makes it more risky from tomorrow onward.
By using these properties of the continuation utilities from autarky and the results by Al-
varez and Jermann (2000) and Kehoe and Levine (2001) (in particular their Proposition 5),
one immediately obtains the following characterization of the consumption distribution for this
economy.
Proposition 2 The constrained eﬃcient symmetric consumption distribution is completely char-
acterized by a number εc(ε) ≥ 0. Agents with labor income 1+ε consume 1+r+εc(ε), and agents
with labor income 1 − ε consume 1+r − εc(ε).T h en u m b e rεc(ε) is the smallest nonnegative
solution of the following equation:
U(1 + r + εc(ε)) = max(UFB(r),U(1 + ε)), (3)
and U(1 + r + εc(ε)) is the lifetime utility of the consumption allocation characterized by εc(ε).
The intuition for this result is simple: in any eﬃcient risk-sharing arrangement, the currently
rich agent has to transfer resources to the currently poor agent. To prevent this agent from
defaulting, she needs to be awarded suﬃciently high current consumption in order to be made
at least indiﬀerent between the risk-sharing arrangement and the autarkic allocation. The
proposition simply states that the eﬃcient consumption allocation features maximal risk sharing,
subject to providing the currently rich agent with suﬃcient incentives not to walk away.
Note that if UFB(r) ≥ U(1 + ε), the smallest solution to equation (3) is εc(ε)=0and the
constrained eﬃcient allocation implies full risk sharing. This also implies that, since the value
of complete markets is strictly increasing in capital income r, ah i g h e rr expands the region of
income dispersions ε for which perfect risk sharing is feasible and thus constrained eﬃcient. Also
13note that unless r =0 , autarky is never constrained eﬃcient, since the equation
U(1 +r + εc(ε)) = U(1 + ε)
i sn e v e rs o l v e db yεc(ε)=ε, unless r =0 .
3.2 Income Variability and Consumption Inequality
We now characterize how the constrained eﬃcient consumption distribution varies with the
variability of income, ε. Remember that ε1 was deﬁned as a unique maximizer of U(1 + ε).
Proposition 3 Fix β ∈ (0,1) and r ≥ 0.
1. If U(1 + ε1) ≤ UFB(r), then perfect consumption insurance is feasible for all ε and a
change in ε has no eﬀect on consumption inequality.
2. If U(1+ε1) >U FB(r), then for ε ∈ [0,ε(r)) and ε ∈ [¯ ε(r),1) perfect consumption insurance
is feasible and a marginal increase in ε has no eﬀect on consumption inequality. If ε ∈
[ε1,¯ ε(r)) a marginal increase in ε leads to a reduction in consumption inequality, whereas
for ε ∈ [ε(r),ε 1) a marginal increase in ε increases consumption inequality. If r>0, the
increase in consumption inequality is strictly smaller than the increase in income inequality.
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the properties of
U(1+ε) stated in Lemma 1, apart from the very last part. The fact that consumption inequality
always increases less than income inequality is obvious for the regions ε ∈ [0,ε(r)), ε ∈ [¯ ε(r),1),
and ε ∈ [ε1,¯ ε(r)), since in these regions consumption inequality does not change or is even
declining in income volatility. For the region ε ∈ [ε1,¯ ε(r)) we have
U(1 +r + εc(ε)) = U(1 + ε)





U0(1 + r + εc(ε))
∈ (0,1)
since U(.) is strictly concave, and eﬃcient risk sharing implies r + εc(ε) <εfor r>0.
14Figure 3 provides some intuition for the proposition above. In the top panel we plot the
value of autarky in the two states, the value of full risk sharing and U(1 + r + ε),a n di nt h e
bottom panel we plot income and consumption dispersion as a function of income dispersion ε.
A ss h o w ni nt h et o pp a n e l ,w es e et h a tf o rε ∈ [0,ε(r)) and ε ∈ [¯ ε(r),1),U FB(r) >U(1+ε),
and thus the ﬁrst best allocation can be implemented. In this case, as shown in the bottom
panel, consumption inequality does not vary with income inequality.
Suppose now that ε1 <ε<¯ ε(r). For example, consider the point ε = εa on the x-axis; from
Proposition 1 the constrained eﬃcient consumption allocation is given by the smallest solution
to U(1 + r + εc(εa)) = U(1 + εa). The top panel of Figure 3 displays the solution εc(εa). In
this allocation, which involves partial risk sharing as εc(εa) <ε a , the agent with high income
receives a continuation utility equal to the value of autarky, whereas the agent with low income
receives U(1 + r − εc(εa)), strictly higher than its value of autarky (U(1 − εa)). In this range a
marginal increase in income inequality reduces the value of autarky for the high-income agent
and less current consumption is required to make her not default (εc(εa) moves to the left). This
reduces consumption dispersion in the economy, as shown in the bottom panel of the ﬁgure.
Finally, in the range ε(r) <ε<ε 1 (consider, for example, the point ε = εb in the ﬁgure),
the constrained eﬃcient allocation is characterized by εc(εb). In this case a marginal increase in
ε increases the value of autarky for the constrained agent, and so her current consumption has
to increase to prevent her from defaulting: consumption inequality increases.
To summarize, in this environment with limited commitment an increase of income dispersion
always leads to a smaller increase in consumption dispersion as long as there is some capital
income. It may even lead to a reduction in consumption dispersion. The intuition behind
these results is that an increase in income inequality, by making exclusion from future risk
sharing more costly, renders the individual rationality constraint less binding. It thereby allows
individuals to share risk to a larger extent and thus reduces ﬂuctuations in their consumption
proﬁles. It is crucial for this result that income shocks are not perfectly permanent (although
they may be highly persistent) because the fear of being poor again in the future is what makes
a currently rich agent transfer resources to his currently poor brethren.18 This analysis suggests
18It is straightforward to generalize our results to a serially correlated endowment process. An increase in
persistence leads to an increase in consumption dispersion in the constrained eﬃcient consumption distribution.
This increase is strict if initially there is some, but not complete, risk sharing. For a proof of this result, see Kehoe
15that the endogenous evolution of (formal, market-based, and informal) risk-sharing mechanisms
can indeed generate a modestly increasing or even declining within-group consumption inequality
despite a substantially increasing within-group income inequality.
3.3 Capital Income and the Extent of Risk Sharing
Finally, we show how the extent of risk sharing depends on how abundant the capital income
r. Since we will study a production economy with capital in our quantitative exercise, it is
instructive to provide some intuition for how the presence (and magnitude) of capital income
aﬀects the extent to which households can share risk. We ﬁnd that risk sharing is increasing
in r, strictly so if risk sharing is not perfect (we already argued above that the region of ε for
which perfect risk sharing obtains is strictly larger the larger the capital income r).
Proposition 4 Let εc(ε;r) characterize the constrained eﬃcient consumption allocation, as a
function of capital income r. Then if ˆ r>r ,we have
εc(ε;ˆ r) ≤ εc(ε;r)
for all ε ∈ (0,1), with inequality the strict if and only if εc(ε;r) > 0. That is, more risk sharing
is possible with capital income ˆ r than with r.
Proof. The only-if part is obvious, since 0 ≤ εc(ε;ˆ r) <ε c(ε;r). For the if part, if εc(ε;ˆ r)=0
the result follows. So suppose εc(ε;ˆ r) > 0. Then
U(1 + ˆ r + εc(ε, ˆ r)) = U(1 + ε). (4)
But if εc(ε;ˆ r) ≥ εc(ε;r) > 0 (perfect risk sharing at r is impossible since the perfect risk sharing
region is smaller at r than at ˆ r), then we obtain a contradiction since
U(1 + ε)=U(1 + r + εc(ε,r)) <U(1 + ˆ r + εc(ε,r)) ≤ U(1 + ˆ r + εc(ε, ˆ r)) = U(1 + ε). (5)
and Levine (2001). The intuition is again simple: the value of autarky for the agent with high current income
increases (as the agent is more likely to have high income in the future with higher persistence), which makes the
individual rationality constraint more stringent and leads to fewer transfers to the poor agent being sustainable.
16In the next section we evaluate the quantitative importance of the mechanism of extended
consumption insurance due to a relaxation of default constraints just described. For this we
employ a production economy with a continuum of agents that face a more realistic income
process than in the simple model; in particular, we will also allow for changes in between-group
inequality.
4 The Model with a Large Number of Agents
4.1 The Environment
As i n g l eg o o db e i n gp r o d u c e di nag i v e np e r i o dc a nb eu s e df o rc o n s u m p t i o no ri n v e s t m e n ti nt h e
physical capital stock K. The representative ﬁrm produces output according to a Cobb-Douglas
production technology Y = AKαL1−α, where L denotes the homogeneous labor input and A is
a technology parameter. The aggregate resource constraint reads as
Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt = AKα
t L1−α
t , (6)
with Ct denoting aggregate consumption and δ denoting the depreciation rate of physical capital.
Labor is inelastically supplied by a continuum of consumers of measure 1. Individuals belong
to diﬀerent groups i ∈ {1,...,M}, with pi denoting the fraction of the population in group i.
We interpret these diﬀerent groups of agents as capturing heterogeneity in the population with
respect to ﬁxed characteristics that aﬀect an individual’s wage and therefore income, such as
education or sex. Since we documented above that an important part of the rise in income
inequality is due to increased between-group inequality, an incorporation of this type of hetero-
geneity appears to be critical for any quantitative study of income and consumption inequality.
An individual in group i has a stochastic labor endowment process {αityt}, where αit is the
deterministic, group-speciﬁc, and possibly time-varying mean labor endowment, and the idio-
syncratic component {yt} follows a Markov process with ﬁnite support Yt, a set with cardinality
N. Since labor income will be the product of individual labor endowment and an economy-wide
wage per eﬃciency unit of labor, we use the terms labor endowment and labor income inter-
changeably. Let πt(y0|y) denote the transition probabilities of the Markov chain, assumed to be
17identical for all agents. The set Yt and the matrix πt are indexed by t s i n c ew ea l l o wf o rt h e
idiosyncratic part of the income process to change over time. Furthermore, we assume a law of
large numbers, so that the fraction of agents facing shock y0 tomorrow with shock y today in the
population is equal to πt(y0|y). Finally, we assume that π0(y0|y) has a unique invariant measure
Π(.). Let us denote by yt the current period labor endowment and by yt =( y0,...,y t) the history
of realizations of endowment shocks; also π(yt|y0)=πt−1(yt|yt−1)···π0(y1|y0). We intend the
notation ys|yt to mean that ys is a possible continuation of labor endowment shock history yt.
We furthermore assume that at date zero the measure over current labor endowments is given
by Π0(.). At date zero agents are distinguished by their group i, their initial asset holdings
(claims to period zero consumption) a0, and by their initial labor endowment shock y0.L e tΦ0





that is, by the sum of all labor endowments in the population. Finally, agents’ preferences are
exactly as described in the simple model of the previous section.
4.2 Market Structures
We now describe the market structure of two incomplete markets economies whose quantitative
properties we will contrast with the stylized empirical facts established in Section 2.
4.2.1 Debt Constraint Markets (DCM)
An individual of type (i,a0,y 0) starts with initial assets a0 and trades Arrow securities subject to
prespeciﬁed credit lines Ai
t(yt,y t+1) that are contingent on observable labor endowment histories
and an agents’ group, and whose exact form is speciﬁed below. The prices for these Arrow
securities are denoted by qt(yt,y t+1) a n dd e p e n do n l yo na na g e n t ’ so w nl a b o re n d o w m e n t
history and time, in order to reﬂect deterministic changes in the income process and hence in
the magnitude of labor endowments αityt.
Consider the problem of an agent of type i with initial conditions (i,a0,y 0). The agent
chooses, conditional on his labor endowment history, consumption {ct(a0,y t)},a n do n e - p e r i o d
18Arrow securities {at+1(a0,y t,y t+1)} whose payoﬀ is conditional on his own endowment realiza-

















qt(yt,y t+1)at+1(a0,yt,y t+1)=wtαityt + at(a0,yt) ∀yt (9)
at+1(a0,yt,y t+1) ≥ Ai
t+1(yt,y t+1) ∀yt,y t+1. (10)
Here wt i st h ew a g er a t ep e re ﬀective unit of labor.
Following Alvarez and Jermann (2000), we specify the short-sale constraints Ai
t(yt,y t+1) as
“solvency constraints” that are not too tight. As before, let UAut
t (i,yt) denote the continua-
tion utility from autarky, given current labor endowment realization αityt. Given a sequence of
prices {qt}∞
t=0 and short-sale constraints {Ai
t(yt,y t+1)}∞
t=0, let us deﬁne the continuation utility
Vt(i,a,yt) of an agent of type i with endowment shock history yt and current asset holdings a
at time t as












subject to (9)and (10). Short-sale constraints {Ai
t(yt,y t+1)}∞
t=0 are not “too tight” if they satisfy
Vt+1(i,Ai
t+1(yt,y t+1),y t+1)=UAut
t+1(i,yt+1) for all (yt,y t+1). (11)
That is, the constraints are such that an agent of type i, having borrowed up to maximum,
at+1(a,yt,y t+1)=Ai
t+1(yt,y t+1),i si n d i ﬀerent between repaying his debt and defaulting, with
the default consequence being speciﬁed as limited future access to ﬁnancial markets. In con-
trast to the simple model, we now allow households to at least save after default, at a state-
uncontingent interest rate rd (a parameter of the model). The value of autarky is then given
19by
UAut















= wsαisys + bs(a0,ys−1) ∀ys
bs+1(a0,ys) ≥ 0
and subject to bt(a0,yt−1)=0 . That is, the defaulting agent starts her life in ﬁnancial autarky
with no assets and can save (but not borrow) at the interest rate rd. For rd = −1, the household
would optimally never save after default, and thus in this case the value of autarky is determined
exactly as in the simple model above.
Deﬁnition 1 Given Φ0,K 0, a competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints {Ai
t(yt,y t+1)}





{Kt,L t} for the ﬁrm, and prices {wt,r t,q t(yt,y t+1)} such that
1. (Household Optimization) Given prices, household allocations maximize (8) subject to (9)
and (10), and the solvency constraints are not “too tight” (in the sense of 11).
2. (Firm Optimization)


























20A stationary equilibrium is one in which {rt,w t} as well as the cross-sectional asset and
consumption distributions are constant over time.
Two comments on the equilibrium deﬁnition: First, in the asset market clearing condition
we divide the right-hand side by the interest rate since the Arrow securities are state-contingent




b e c a u s eh o u s e h o l d sh a v et ob ei n d i ﬀerent between saving with risk-free capital or reconstructing
a risk-free asset with the full set of Arrow securities. (Note that with the full set of Arrow
securities, risk-free capital is a redundant asset for households, so we explicitly abstained from
introducing purchases of risk-free capital in the household problem.) Physical capital in our
economy is not important as an additional asset, but is important in the sense that it provides
the economy as a whole with an asset in positive net supply and therefore a positive wealth-
to-income ratio. The simple model above demonstrated that the more abundant the capital
(income), the better the extent of consumption insurance achievable in the DCM model.
Notice that the dispersion of the income process aﬀects the debt constraints, and thus the
extent to which individual agents can borrow, in exactly the same way it aﬀected the extent
of risk sharing in the simple model of Section 3. An increase in the dispersion of the income
process increases not only the necessity of extended borrowing to smooth consumption, but
also the possibility of extended borrowing since the default option may become less attractive.
This eﬀect is the driving force behind our main quantitative result that an increase in the
cross-sectional dispersion of income may not lead to a signiﬁcant increase in cross-sectional
consumption inequality.
4.2.2 Standard Incomplete Markets (SIM)
We now compare our results to those obtained in a standard incomplete markets model, as in
Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994). Let qin
t denote the price, at period t, of an uncontingent
claim to one unit of the consumption good in period t +1 . The sequential budget constraints
21the agent faces are
ct(a0,yt)+qin
t at+1(a0,yt)=wtαityt + at(a0,yt−1) (12)
and the short-sale constraints become
at+1(a0,yt) ≥− αit ¯ B. (13)
The deﬁnitions of equilibrium and stationary equilibrium for this economy are similar to the
ones discussed above and are hence omitted. Notice that the only diﬀerences between the two
economies are the set of ﬁnancial assets that are traded (a full set of contingent claims in the
DCM model and only a single uncontingent bond in the SIM model) and how the short-sale
constraints that limit these asset trades are speciﬁed.
In order to compute calibrated versions of both economies, we reformulate them recursively.
Note that the computation of equilibrium in the DCM model requires us to solve for both prices
and borrowing constraints simultaneously (see Appendix B for details).
5 The Quantitative Exercise
We now explain the quantitative exercise we carry out below. It involves the following steps:
1. We ﬁrst choose parameter values so that the stationary equilibrium in both economies
matches key observations of the U.S. economy in the 1980s. This applies, in particular, to
the deterministic and stochastic part of the labor productivity and thus income process.
2. We then introduce a ﬁnite path of changes in the dispersion of the labor productivity
process to mimic the increase in income inequality observed in the U.S. data. We assume
that this change in the labor productivity process is unforeseen by agents, but that all
future changes in the process are fully learned once the ﬁrst change occurs.
3. The change in the labor productivity process for a ﬁnite number of periods induces a
transition in both models from the initial to a ﬁnal stationary equilibrium associated with
the process that prevails once the change in that process has been completed.
224. Both models endogenously generate consumption distributions along the transition from
the old to the new steady state. We compute measures of consumption inequality for both
models and compare them to the empirical facts established in Section 2. In order to carry
out these steps, we now specify the parameters of both models.
5.1 Calibration
We need to choose (a) technology parameters A,δ,α, (b) preference parameters β and σ (the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function,
( c )t h ee n d o w m e n tp r o c e s s{αityt}∞
t=0 with yt ∈ Yt and αit ∈ At, (d) the transition matrices πt,
(e) the group sizes pi, (f) the borrowing constraint ¯ B for the SIM model, and (g) the autarkic
interest rate rd for the DCM model.
5.1.1 Income Process
W et a k et h el e n g t ho fam o d e lp e r i o dt ob eo n ey e a r .A ni n d i v i d u a l ’ sl a b o ri n c o m eeit = wtαityt
consists of a common wage; a group-speciﬁc, time-dependent deterministic part, αit;a n da n
idiosyncratic stochastic component, yt. In the empirical section we decomposed individual income
and consumption data into a group-speciﬁc component and an idiosyncratic component. Our
calibration strategy follows the same approach. The logarithm of labor income is given by
ln(eit)=l n ( wt)+l n ( αit)+l n ( yt),






et = Va r[ln(eit)],σ 2
αt = Va r[ln(αit)],a n dσ2




with the between- and within-group income variances plotted in Figure 2. We ﬁrst HP-ﬁlter
(with a smoothing parameter of 400) the time series {σ2
αt,σ2
yt}2003
t=1980, in order to remove high-
frequency variation in our empirical variances. We then choose parameters governing the model
income process so that (a) in the initial stationary equilibrium, both the between- and within-
group income variances of the model match the ﬁltered data for the early 1980s and (b) along
23the transition, trends in between- and within-group income variances are reproduced by the
model.
5.1.2 Between-Group Income Inequality
We pick the number of groups to be two with equal mass pi =0 .5. For the initial stationary
equilibrium we choose the group-speciﬁcm e a n sa sα1 = e−σ1980 and α2 = eσα1980. Similarly,
using σα2003 we obtain average group incomes for the ﬁnal steady state, persisting from 2003
into the indeﬁnite future. For the transition path we then select {α1t,α 2t}2003
t=1981 so that the
trend of between-group income inequality follows that in the data.
Since {α1t,α 2t}∞
t=1980 is a deterministic sequence, in the context of both models considered
in this paper, the increase in between-group income inequality translates fully into an increase in
between-group consumption inequality. Furthermore, by construction, the change in between-
group inequality does not aﬀect the quantitative importance of the risk-sharing mechanism at
work for within-group stochastic income variability described in Section 3.
We choose this speciﬁcation for two reasons. First, in an inﬂuential paper Attanasio and
Davis (1996) show that between-group consumption insurance fails, and they conclude that “the
evidence is highly favorable to an extreme alternative hypothesis under which relative consump-
tion growth equals relative wage growth” (p. 1247). With our speciﬁcation of average group
income, changes in this income component are not (self-)insurable, consistent with their ﬁnd-
ings. Second, we will be able to quantify exactly to what extent the (self-)insurance mechanisms
of both models can oﬀset the increase in idiosyncratic income volatility. The potency of these
mechanisms depends on the properties of the idiosyncratic income process, discussed next.
5.1.3 Within-Group Income Variability
We model the idiosyncratic part of the income process, ln(yt), as the sum of a persistent and a
transitory component, as in Storesletten et al. (1998, 2004) or Heathcote et al. (2004):
ln(yt)=zt + εt
zt = ρzt−1 + ηt. (14)
24Here εt,ηt are independent, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed random variables
with zero mean and variances σ2
εt,σ2
ηt, respectively. We explicitly allow these variances to change
over time, whereas we treat ρ as a time-invariant parameter. Note, however, that if σ2
εt and σ2
ηt
increase at diﬀerent rates over time, the implied persistence of the idiosyncratic component of
income, ln(yt), changes. Thus, the process we use is ﬂexible enough to allow for time-varying
income persistence even if ρ is constant over time. As a benchmark value for ρ we choose
ρ =0 .9989, the value Storesletten et al. (2004) ﬁnd when estimating the process in (14). As a
sensitivity analysis we also report results for lower persistence parameters.
We now describe how, from our data on {σ2
yt}2003
t=1980 and conditional on the value of ρ,w e
identify the unobserved variance of the transitory part, σ2
εt, and the variance of the persistent
part, σ2
zt (or equivalently σ2
ηt). The key statistics that allow us to identify σ,a n dσ2
zt are the
observed cross-sectional within-group income variance σ2
yt and the cross-sectional within-group
income auto-covariance Cov(yt,y t+1), which, thanks to the short panel dimension of the CE
data, we can measure in our sample. The two identifying equations for (σ2
zt,σ2
εt) are easily
derived for our income process:







Given ρ, Cov(yt,y t+1),a n dσ2
yt,t h ev a l u e sf o rσ2
zt and σ2
εt are uniquely determined.
Equipped with time series for {σ2
εt,σ2
zt}2003
t=1980 from the data, we now specify a discretized
version of the process in (14). The purely transitory component, at period t with equal proba-
bility, takes one of the two values {ε1t,ε 2t}. If we choose ε1t = −σεt and ε2t = σεt, the transitory
shock fed into the model has a variance exactly as big as identiﬁed in the data, for all time
periods. Finally, for the persistent part of the process we use a seven-state Markov chain with
time-varying states and transition probabilities such that the variance of this process, in each
period, equals σ2
zt as identiﬁed from the data.19 Note that after 24 model periods (2003 in real
19We employ the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) procedure to discretize the AR(1) process. As inputs this procedure
requires that ρ =0 .9989 (in the benchmark) and a (time-varying) variance σ
2
ηt. The variance σ
2
ηt was chosen in
such a way that the implied variance σ
2
zt from the Markov chain matches the σ
2
zt in the data.
25time), the change in the dispersion of the income process is completed. However, due to the
endogenous wealth dynamics in both models, it may take substantially longer than 24 years for
both economies to complete the transition to the new stationary consumption distribution.
To summarize, the income process fed into the model perfectly reproduces the empirically
identiﬁed time series of between-group income variance σ2
αt,a sw e l la st h ew i t h i n - g r o u pi n c o m e
variance due to the transitory shock, σ2
εt, and the persistent shock, σ2
zt. Figure 4 displays the
original and HP-ﬁltered time series of these variances, identical for data and both models. We
observe that all three components increase substantially over time, contributing to the overall
increase in income inequality σ2
yt. Of the overall increase of 18 percentage points in the variance
of the ﬁltered data, 36% is due to the change in the variance of between-group income, 40% is
due to the persistent part, and 24% is due to the transitory part. Thus we conﬁrm Violante’s
(2002) ﬁndings that a signiﬁcant part of the increase in wage or earnings inequality is due to
bigger transitory shocks. The implied overall persistence of the idiosyncratic income process
ln(yt)=zt + εt is roughly constant over time, with a very slight decline.
5.1.4 Exogenous Borrowing Limit and Autarkic Interest Rate
As a benchmark borrowing limit in the SIM model, we set ¯ B =1 . Note that we normalize
endowment in such a way that this borrowing limit corresponds to a generous one times the
average annual income for each group i. As a benchmark in the DCM model, we allow households
to save at the initial equilibrium interest rate, rd = r in autarky. We then report how sensitive
our quantitative results are to the choice of the borrowing limit and the autarkic interest rate.
5.1.5 Technology and Preference Parameters
We assume that the period utility is logarithmic, u(c) = log(c). We then choose the technology
parameters (A,α,δ) so that in both models the initial steady state has a wage rate of 1 (a
normalization), a capital income share of 30%,a n dar e t u r no np h y s i c a lc a p i t a lo f4% per
annum, as suggested in McGrattan and Prescott (2003). The time discount factor β is then
set in both models such that the initial steady state in both models has a capital (wealth) -to-
output ratio of 2.6. This value is equal to the average wealth (including ﬁnancial wealth and
housing wealth) for CE households in the benchmark sample in 1980—1981, and it is also close
26to the value estimated in NIPA data by Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002). Note that,
conditional on the capital-output ratio target, the three technology parameters solve the three
equations α =0 .3 and
















which yields δ =7 .54% and A =0 .9637 in both models, since the production side of the
economy is identical in both. The appropriate choice of the time discount factor β then ensures
that households indeed have the incentive to save exactly the amount required to make the
capital-output ratio equal to 2.6. This requires a β =0 .959 for the DCM model and a β =0 .954
for the SIM model. In our sensitivity analyses we always recalibrate β to maintain the same
equilibrium capital-output ratio in the initial steady state.20
6 Quantitative Results
6.1 Benchmark Calibration
We now document the quantitative predictions of both models with respect to the evolution of
consumption inequality and compare them to the data. Since in our calibration we used ﬁltered
income variances as targets, we also ﬁlter the consumption inequality statistics to remove high-
frequency ﬂuctuations. Figure 5 summarizes the main quantitative results of our paper. The
left panel displays the change in the between-group variance of log-consumption implied by both
models as well as the data. The right panel does the same for the within-group variance of
log-consumption, our main focus of interest. Since the sum of the between- and within-group
variance of consumption equals the overall variance, the change in the overall variance from the
data and both models can be readily deduced from the two panels.
Since the change in between-group income inequality is modeled by a deterministic process,
by construction there is no (self-)insurance possible against the increase in between-group income
variability. Thus, in the long run all of the increase in between-group income inequality is
20Since the other statistics are determined exclusively from the production side of the economy, changes in ¯ B
or rb do not require recalibration of A,α,δ.
27reﬂected in a one-for-one increase in between-group consumption inequality in both models. It
is therefore not surprising that both models have nearly identical predictions for that part of
consumption inequality. As shown in panel (a) of Figure 2, the fact that in the data the increase
in between-group income inequality is similar to the increase in between-group consumption
inequality implies that the increase in between-group inequality predicted by both models is
similar to the one observed in the data.
The crucial diﬀerences between the two models are the ﬁnancial instruments that can be used
to (self-)insure idiosyncratic income risk, the borrowing limits that constrain the use of these
instruments, and the change of these limits over time. Thus, the crucial quantitative question is
how well both models can capture the trend in within-group consumption inequality. The right
panel of Figure 5 answers this question. It shows that, for our benchmark parameterization, the
DCM model understates and the SIM model overstates the increase in within-group consumption
inequality, compared to the data. Although the data display an increase in the variance of about
2.0%, the DCM model shows an increase of only 0.5%, whereas the standard incomplete markets
model predicts an increase of 4.5% compared to the data.21 To put these numbers in perspective,
note that the increase in within-group income variance from the data and fed into the models is
11%. Thus, both models are successful in generating an increase in within-group consumption
inequality that is substantially lower than that for income inequality, in line with the data.
The empirical evidence of increasing both between-group and within-group consumption
inequality also speaks against the standard complete markets model. That model, by allow-
ing perfect consumption insurance between and within groups, counterfactually predicts that
between-group, within-group, and total consumption inequality should remain completely un-
changed over time.
T h eq u a n t i t a t i v ed i ﬀerence in the change of within-group consumption inequality in the two
models is due to the diﬀerential response of consumer credit to increased income volatility. In
the SIM model the increase in the variance of income leads to higher precautionary savings.
In addition, households facing larger shocks become more hesitant to borrow, plus their ability
21Note that if both panels of Figure 5 are combined, the overall increase in consumption inequality in the data
is, even in a quantitative sense, almost perfectly matched by the DCM model. But since this is due to the fact
that this model overstates the increase in between-group consumption inequality and understates the increase in
within-group consumption inequality, we do not want to stress this ﬁnding. The SIM model, however, overstates
both components of inequality and thus the extent of the overall increase in consumption inequality.
28to borrow remains unchanged. Thus, outstanding unsecured consumer credit (as a fraction
of output) declines by 0.6%, equilibrium asset holdings and thus the physical capital stock
increase by 2.1%, and the real return on capital declines by 17 basis points. In contrast, in
the DCM model credit limits expand for the purchase of all Arrow securities, and households
can and do borrow more, at least against the contingency of having higher income tomorrow.
This is reﬂected in an increase in outstanding unsecured consumer credit (again, as a fraction
of output) by 2.1%. But keeping consumption as smooth as it was before the change in the
income process may require a bigger expansion in borrowing than is feasible with the new,
wider constraints, so some of the increase in income volatility is reﬂe c t e di nc o n s u m p t i o n :t h e
within-group consumption variance increases, albeit only very mildly. The expansion of credit
in the DCM model is met by an increase in purchases of Arrow securities, as households have
a stronger need to save for the contingency of being income-poor tomorrow. On net, aggregate
savings and thus the capital stock increases by 1.8% and the return on capital falls by 15 basis
points. The increase in the capital stock and the decline in the interest rate are smaller than
those in the SIM model because the increase in asset accumulation in the debt constraint model
is partially oﬀset by a higher demand for credit, an eﬀe c tt h a ti sa b s e n ti nt h eS I Mm o d e l .A
precise quantitative evaluation of both models with respect to the CE data along the credit
dimension is not possible because data on unsecured consumer credit are not available in our
CE sample. At least qualitatively, however, the DCM model seems more consistent with recent
developments in U.S. credit markets (see also our Figure 7 in the conclusion).
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we document how sensitive our main ﬁndings are to changes in the tightness of
the borrowing constraints and the high persistence of the income shock. Finally we assess the
performance of a hybrid model that inherits elements of both the SIM and DCM models.
6.2.1 Borrowing Constraints
In Table 2 we report results for diﬀerent values of the borrowing constraint for the SIM model.
We normalized the production function in such a way that, in the initial steady state, average
wages are equal to 1. Thus, a borrowing constraint of B =2implies that a household can take
29out (noncollateralized) loans up to twice her annual average labor income. We also document
how our results for the DCM model change if we reduce the net real interest rate at which
households can save in autarky to zero, making the default option less attractive. The statistics
we report are the change, between 1980 and 2003, in the within-group consumption (in logs)
variance, the change in the outstanding credit-to-GDP ratio, and the change in the real interest
rate.
Table 2. Change in Borrowing Constraints
Economy ∆Va r ∆Credit (%) ∆r (%)
SIM, B =0 0.0456 0 −0.20
SIM, B =1 0.0454 −0.62 −0.17
SIM, B =2 0.0463 −0.88 −0.15
DCM, rd =4 % 0.0049 2.05 −0.15
DCM, rd =0 % 0.0012 12.34 −0.03
The most important observation from Table 2 is that more generous credit lines per se, if they
do not change over time, do not help to keep the increase in within-group consumption inequality
low in the SIM model. For this result, the existence of capital as an asset in positive net supply
is crucial. Since the wealth-to-output ratio is calibrated to 2.6 in the model, most households
are far to the right from the borrowing constraint in the wealth distribution. In addition, with
highly persistent income shocks, they are very reluctant to obtain credit in response to bad
income shocks. In fact, as these shocks become bigger over time, households become even more
timid in using credit and try to stay away from high debt positions. We observe from the table
that the credit-to-GDP ratio declines with the increase in income volatility, the more so the
looser the borrowing constraint and thus the higher the debt position of those at the constraint.
For the DCM model, reducing the interest rate at which people can save after default leads
to a worse autarkic option, and thus to more borrowing being enforceable. In fact, with an
rd = −2% (i.e., households can save only at a negative real interest rate of 2%), the default
option is so unattractive that perfect risk sharing is possible and the predictions of the DCM
model collapse to those of the standard complete markets model. Reducing the autarkic savings
interest rate gives rise not only to better risk allocation in the initial steady state, but also
to a stronger relaxation of borrowing constraints over time. As a result, the use of credit
30expands substantially and there is almost no increase in within-group consumption inequality
over time, reducing the ability of the DCM model to match the data relative to the benchmark
parameterization. Also note that with rd =0 % , the increase in credit demand almost matches
the increased savings demand, so that the real interest rate and the capital stock remain virtually
unchanged as income variability increases.
6.2.2 Persistence of Income Shocks
At least since Friedman (1957) it has been well understood that very persistent income shocks are
harder to self-insure against than income shocks that are transitory in nature. Our idiosyncratic
income process is the sum of a highly persistent and a purely transitory component. Although
authors that estimate this process from wage data consistently ﬁnd the persistence parameter ρ
close to 1, some disagreement exists about its exact magnitude. We have repeated our analysis
for various other choices of ρ and report, in Table 3, results for ρ =0 .8, the value estimated by
Guvenen (2005), which is the lowest estimate for ρ we are aware of, for the exact income process
we use.22 In each case we recalibrate the income process and time discount factor such that the
cross-sectional income dispersion of the process fed into the model matches the empirical facts
from Figure 4, and the initial real return on capital remains at 4%. This procedure keeps the
volatility of the income process unchanged, but reduces its persistence.
Table 3. Change in Persistence: ρ =0 .8
Economy ∆Va r ∆Credit (%) ∆r (%)
SIM, B =0 0.0355 0 −0.28
SIM, B =1 0.0334 −0.01 −0.22
SIM, B =2 0.0341 0.0 −0.19
DCM, rd =4 % 0.0025 1.33 −0.10
DCM, rd =2 .5% 0.0013 3.93 −0.04
Comparing the results of Table 3 with those in Table 2, we see that a lower persistence of
income shocks in the SIM model indeed reduces the rise in within-group consumption inequality.
22The ρ =0 .8 is the lowest estimate reported in his Table 1. Heaton and Lucas (1996) estimate a simple AR(1)
process; that is, they do not have an independent purely transitory shock. Thus, if the true process is the one we
use, their estimated ρ =0 .53 is a downward-biased estimate of the true autoregressive coeﬃcient.
We also repeated our exercises with ρ =0 .95, the value reported by Storesletten et al. (1998). The results,
available upon request, are quite similar to those for ρ =0 .9989.
31Whereas for ρ =0 .9989 this increase rise was about 4.5%, with ρ =0 .8 it drops to about 3.4%
(compared to 2% in the data). Again, the results are fairly independent of the borrowing
constraint. With lower persistence, households in the SIM model ﬁnd it easier to self-insure by
accumulating capital and using it to smooth income shocks. The increase in the capital stock
(and corresponding decline in the real return) is more pronounced for ρ =0 .8 than for ρ =0 .9989.
Also, households now are not as timid as before to use credit to smooth income shocks; instead of
a decline of credit as a fraction of GDP, we now observe this statistic to be virtually unchanged.
We conclude that setting persistence of the income shocks to the lower bound from the empirical
literature leads to a lesser increase of within-group consumption inequality in the SIM model.
Still, that model somewhat overstates the increase observed in the data.
In the DCM model, a lower ρ reduces the value of autarky for households with currently
high income whose constraints are binding because it is now less likely that they will remain
income-rich. Thus, ceteris paribus, the implications of the DCM model are closer to those of
the complete markets model. In fact, for ρ =0 .8 any autarkic interest rate below 2% leads
to complete consumption insurance. Thus, although the results for this persistence are not
identical to the complete markets model, they are quantitatively close, making the model’s
understatement of the increase in within-group consumption inequality more severe.
6.2.3 Market Completeness or Endogenous Borrowing Constraints?
There are two main diﬀerences between our DCM model and the SIM model.23 First, our model
features a full set of Arrow securities, and second, borrowing constraints adjust endogenously
to changes in the income process. To evaluate whether introducing time-varying borrowing
constraints in the SIM model helps to bring that model’s predictions closer to the data, we now
present results for a hybrid model. This model, named after Zhang (1997), retains the market
structure of the SIM model in that agents can trade only a risk-free, uncontingent bond. The
borrowing constraint, however, is now allowed to vary over time: agents can borrow up to the
maximum amount such that in all possible states tomorrow, they are at least weakly better oﬀ
repaying their debt rather than defaulting and living in autarky from there on.
Table 4 displays a crucial lesson: introducing time-dependent borrowing constraints into the
23We thank Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas for helpful discussions leading to this subsection.
32SIM model, at least in the way proposed by Zhang, does not alter the quantitative implications of
the model with respect to the change in within-group consumption inequality. It does, however,
enable the model to reproduce the empirically observed increase in the use of credit.
Table 4. A Hybrid Model
Economy ∆Va r ∆Va r 0 ∆Credit (%) ∆r (%)
SIM, ρ =0 .9989,B=1 0.0454 0.0095 −0.62 −0.17
Zhang, ρ =0 .9989 0.0469 −0.0112 1.7 −0.16
DCM, ρ =0 .9989,r d =4 % 0.0049 0.0015 2.05 −0.15
SIM, ρ =0 .8,B=1 0.0334 0.0049 −0.01 −0.22
Zhang, ρ =0 .8 0.0348 −0.0154 1.6 −0.22
DCM, ρ =0 .8,r d =4 % 0.0025 0.0007 1.33 −0.10
To explain the driving forces behind these results, Table 4 reports not only the change in
within-consumption inequality between the ﬁrst and last periods of the income transition (the
column labeled ∆Va r), but also the change between the initial steady state and the ﬁrst period
of the transition (the column labeled ∆Va r 0). Households, on impact, respond very diﬀerently
to the unexpected change in the income process in the Zhang economy, compared to the SIM
economy. In the Zhang economy, credit lines expand on impact and households make use of
these expanded credit lines. As a result, consumption inequality initially falls. But this comes
at a price: households that have borrowed more now face higher debt levels and income processes
with more extreme realizations. Over time, the debt needs to be serviced, consumption has to
respond, and consumption inequality eventually goes up (about ﬁve periods after impact). After
25 years the change in consumption inequality is the same as in the benchmark SIM model.24
Thus, borrowing constraints that are relaxed over time help households in the short run to better
smooth more volatile income ﬂuctuations, but in the long run their debt burden catches up with
them. As a result, consumption inequality does not increase in the short run, but eventually it
does increase to the same extent as in the standard model.
W h yd o e s n ’ tt h es a m el o g i ca p p l yi nt h eD C Mm o d e l ?H e r ei sw h e r et h es e c o n df e a t u r eo f
24Another way to explain this is to note that with highly persistent shocks, an increase in the variance of
these shocks leads to an increase in the cross-sectional variance of permanent income of comparable magnitude,
something that Bowlus and Robin (2004) argue occurred empirically in the United States. Not surprisingly, a
higher dispersion of permanent income eventually leads to a larger dispersion of consumption in the SIM model.
33that model, state-contingent borrowing, comes in. In the DCM model households with currently
high income enter the period with high debt, exactly because they have borrowed against the
contingency of being income-rich. Thus, the high debt is not such a high burden, and households
can and do make use of the higher credit lines without the consequence of particularly low
consumption in the future. In sharp contrast, in the SIM model income-poor people start the
period with outstanding credit (because of the strong positive correlation of income and the
fact that they went into debt because of bad income realizations). Thus, in that model highly
indebted households eventually have to accept (persistently) low consumption. Put another
way, in the SIM model assets and income are highly positively correlated, whereas in the DCM
model they are negatively correlated. Therefore, in one model being in debt has fairly persistent
negative consequences for consumption; in the other model it does not.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we use CE survey data to document that the increase in income inequality for
the United States in the last 25 years has not been accompanied by a substantial increase
in consumption inequality. We propose a theory that provides a simple explanation for this
observation. If the increase in income inequality has been driven, at least partially, by an
increase in idiosyncratic labor income risk, then the value households place on access to formal
and informal credit and insurance mechanisms rises, and the scope of these mechanisms may
endogenously broaden. Individual consumption may then be better insulated against (higher)
income risk, and cross-sectional consumption inequality may increase only mildly. If, however,
the structure of private ﬁnancial markets and informal insurance arrangements does not respond
to changes in the underlying stochastic income process of individuals, then no further hedging
against the increasing risk is possible, and the increase in income inequality leads to a more
pronounced rise in consumption inequality.
The mechanism through which agents in the DCM model of the last section keep their
consumption proﬁles stable in the light of more volatile income is an expansion in the use of
noncollateralized credit. Did this expansion take place in the data? One simple (but of course
only partial) measure of credit available that is used by U.S. consumers is the ratio of aggregate
34unsecured consumer credit to disposable income. In Figure 6 we plot this ratio from U.S. data
for the last 40 years, as well as the Gini coeﬃcient for U.S. household income.25 Despite some
idiosyncratic cyclical variations, the two series display a remarkably similar trend. Combining
this ﬁgure with our consumption inequality observations may suggest that consumers could and
in fact did make stronger use of credit markets exactly when they needed to (starting in the
mid-1970s), in order to insulate consumption from bigger income ﬂuctuations. We want to stress
that we view the expansion of credit lines in the DCM model as a metaphor for the expansion of
a variety of formal and informal risk-sharing mechanisms, with formal credit being an important,
but by no means the only, component.
Both models evaluated in this paper have their shortcomings. The DCM model hypothesizes
very well-developed–maybe too developed–direct insurance markets. Although the complete
s e to fA r r o ws e c u r i t i e sc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e dt os t a n di nf o rt h eh o s to fa s s e t st r a d e di nﬁnancial
markets and for informal insurance mechanisms working on the level of the extended family, some
may question the empirical realism of this assumption, which is important for our results, as
demonstrated in the last section. This model is consistent with the empirically observed increase
in credit and the only slight increase in consumption inequality over time. On the one hand,
it overstates the degree to which individual consumption is insulated from income shocks and
understates the response of within-group consumption inequality to increased income volatility.
On the other hand, the SIM model may have a more realistic market structure, but seems to
allow somewhat too little explicit insurance against income shocks, over and above simple self-
insurance. In our application it therefore overstates the level and the increase in within-group
consumption inequality. It also does not display an increase in the use of uncollateralized credit
over time, unless more ﬂexible borrowing constraints are introduced. In their work, Blundell et
al. (2004) and Storesletten et al. (2004) come to the same qualitative conclusion.
Conditional on these ﬁndings, we conjecture that a model that, like the DCM, has an endoge-
nous evolution of credit markets but that, unlike the DCM, restricts the insurance possibilities
available to agents (possibly restricting the spanning of the insurance contracts) might be even
25The series for consumer credit is from the 2005 Economic Report of the President, Table B-77. It only
includes revolving consumer credit, which is entirely unsecured. The series is available starting from 1968. Personal
disposable income is obtained from the same source, Table B-30. The Gini index for household income is available,
starting from 1967, from the U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables, Table H-4.
35more empirically successful in matching the data. Further empirical work using micro data may
inform us how to more precisely model the mechanisms that households can use to smooth out
idiosyncratic income shocks. We defer this work to ongoing and future research.
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40Appendix A Data Description
In this appendix we provide a detailed description of the income and consumption data we use
in the paper.
A.1 CE Files and Observations
Our data come from the CE Interview Surveys 1980 through 2003 (which also contain data
for the ﬁrst quarter of 2004) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Consumption
expenditure data are from the Family Characteristics and Income (FAMILY) ﬁles except for the
years 1982 and 1983, for which the FAMILY ﬁles do not contain consumption information. For
those years we obtain consumption data from the Detailed Expenditures (MTAB) ﬁles. Note that
the consumption information in the FAMILY ﬁles is just an aggregation of the information in the
MTAB ﬁles. Income data are from the FAMILY ﬁles and hours worked by household members
(used to construct wages) are from the Member Characteristics and Income (MEMBER) ﬁles.
A no b s e r v a t i o ni no u rd a t as e tc o n s i s t so fa l lt h ei n f o r m a t i o nc o l l e c t e di nag i v e ni n t e r v i e wf o r
a given household (identiﬁed by a unique ID number). Each household is present in no more
than four observations.
A.2 Consumption Categories
In Table A1 we report all the categories of consumption expenditures we use, together with the
BLS price index we use to deﬂate them. Categories 1 through 20 are reported directly in the CE
for every observation, and we derived categories 21 and 22 as described below. Our deﬁnition
of ND consumption (used in Table 1) includes categories 1 through 13. Our measure of ND+
consumption includes ND consumption, categories 20 and 21, plus categories 14 though 18.
These latter categories contain expenditures on durable goods, but since we do not have enough
information to compute imputed services from those durables, we simply include expenditures.
Finally, our deﬁnition of total consumption expenditures (used in Table 1) includes categories 1
through 20. We now describe in more detail some of the categories.
A.2.1 Food Expenditures Correction
A change in survey methodology (see Battistin, 2003, for details) causes a sizeable (about 15%)
systematic downward bias in reported food expenditures for all the observations in the years
1982—1987. In order to correct for this bias, we regress the log of food expenditures for all years on
a quadratic time trend, on quadratics in income and total nonfood consumption expenditures,
on weeks worked, on a complete set of household characteristics (including age, education,
region of residence, and family composition), on a dummy for the period 1982—1987, and on the
interactions term of the dummy with all other independent variables. We then use the regression
coeﬃcients to scale up food expenditures for every observation in the period 1982—1987.
A.2.2 Services from Vehicles
Each CE observation contains reports of expenditures for purchases of new and used vehicles.
The CE also reports the number of cars owned by the household in that quarter. For each year
we ﬁrst select all observations that report positive expenditures for vehicle purchases, and run
41a regression of these expenditures on quadratics in income and total nonvehicle consumption
expenditures, weeks worked by household members, expenditures on gasoline, expenditures on
public transportation, vehicle maintenance expenditures, the number of cars owned, a complete
set of household characteristics (including age, education, region of residence, and family com-
position), plus quarter dummies. These regressions have an R2 that ranges from 74% to 94% in
our sample years. On average, in every year a little more than 10% of households report positive
expenditures on vehicles. We use the estimated regression coeﬃcients to predict expenditures for
vehicles for all households in that year (i.e., for those who did and for those who did not report
positive vehicle expenditures). Our measure of consumption services from vehicles, then, is the
predicted expenditures on vehicles, times the number of cars the consumer unit owns, times 1
32
(reﬂecting the assumption of average complete depreciation of a vehicle after 32 quarters).
A.2.3 Services from Primary Residence
Each observation in the CE provides information on whether the household rents or owns its
primary residence. If the household rents, we measure housing services as the rent paid, including
insurance and other out-of-pocket expenses paid by the renter. To impute housing services for
those households that own, we use a variable from the CE that measures the market rent (as
estimated by the reference person of the consumer unit) the residence would command if rented
out. This variable is not available for all years of the sample, in particular not for the years
1980—1981 and 1993—1994. Thus, in order to compute this variable in a uniform way across our
sample, we use an imputation procedure similar to the one used for vehicles. For the year for
which we have the reported market rent of the unit, we regressed it on self-reported property
values, quadratics in income and total nonhousing consumption expenditures, a complete set of
household characteristics (including age, education, region of residence, and family composition),
plus quarter dummies. Since property values are reported by only a subset of the home owners,
we allow the coeﬃcient of the regression to be diﬀerent for those who reported the property
value from those who did not. These regressions have an R2 that ranges from 30% to 55%
i no u rs a m p l ey e a r s . W et h e nu s ee s t i m a t e dr e g r e s s i o nc o e ﬃcients to predict the rental value
of owned properties for all the home owners. For the years 1980—1981 we use the coeﬃcient
estimated in 1982, and for the years 1993—1994 we use the coeﬃcients estimated in 1995. For
the years 1982—1992 and 1995—2003, we have both the actual and the imputed rental equivalent
of the owned home, so we computed the trends in consumption inequality using housing services
computed in both ways. The resulting trends are extremely similar.
A.3 Sample Selection
We ﬁrst exclude observations for which there is clear evidence of measurement error. In par-
ticular we exclude observations classiﬁed as incomplete income respondents, observations that
report zero food expenditures for the quarter, those who report only food expenditures for the
quarter, and those who report positive labor income but no hours worked. We then exclude all
observations with an age of the household head below 21 or above 64, and those with negative
or zero LEA+ earnings. In our benchmark sample we also exclude observations with weekly
42wages of the reference person below half of the minimum wage, households classiﬁed as rural,
and those households that have not completed the full set of four interviews.
A.4 Aggregation and Top-Coding
Inequality measures are computed on annual cross sections. We assign an observation to a given
year if the last interview of that household is completed between April of that year and March of
the following year. Whenever income or consumption expenditures are top-coded, we set them
to their top-coding thresholds. We have experimented with increasing the values of top-coded
income/consumption components (multiplying the threshold by 1.5). Inequality measures are
robust to these changes because in general, the number of observations with top-coded income
or consumption ﬁgures never exceeds 2% in a given quarter.
A.5 Data Availability
Our data set in Stata format, including brief documentation, is available at http://pages.stern.
nyu.edu/~fperri/research_data.htm.
Appendix B Recursive Formulation and Computational Algorithm
In this appendix we formulate the consumer problem for the DCM model recursively and provide
a sketch of the algorithm used to compute a stationary equilibrium. In the nonstationary case
(that is, along the transition), the logic remains the same but all functions have to be indexed
by t. For simplicity here we omit the distinction by types and lump into y the transitory and
persistent income shocks. The equilibrium problem is nonstandard because one needs to solve
not only for prices but also for endogenous borrowing constraints. We ﬁrst compute the value












We then guess the risk-free rate R =1 /q. No arbitrage implies that the prices of the Arrow
securities q(y0|y) are a function of our guess and are given by qπ(y0|y). We guess borrowing
constraints Ai(y0) and solve the consumer problem, taking these borrowing constraints Ai(y0)
and prices for Arrow securities qπ(y0|y) as given:
















q(y0|y)a0(y0)=αiy + aa 0 ≥ Ai(y0).
We ﬁnally check to make sure the borrowing constraints are not too tight by asking whether
V (y0,A i(y0)) = UAut(y0,0)
43for all y0. If the equalities hold, then we have solved for the borrowing constraints associated with
the guessed interest rate; if not, we update the guesses for Ai(y0) until all equalities hold. Once
we have found the borrowing constraints that are not too tight, we use the associated optimal
asset policies a0(y,a;y0) together with the transition probabilities π to deﬁne the operator H
that maps current measures over wealth and income shocks into tomorrow’s measures. We then
compute the (unique) ﬁxed point of the operator H and denote it by Φ. Given Φ and the optimal
consumption policies, we can check the market clearing conditions. If market clearing holds, we
have found a stationary equilibrium; if not, we update our guess of the interest rate R = 1
q.
We implement this procedure numerically by approximating value and policy functions with
piecewise linear functions over the state space. For more details on the basic algorithm and on
the theoretical characterization of the stationary equilibrium, see Krueger and Perri (1999).
44Table A1. Consumption Categories and Deflators
Number Category CPI Used to Deflate
a
Nondurable Expenditures
1 Food Food SAF1
2 Alcoholic beverages Alcoholic beverages SAF116
3 Tobacco Tobacco and smoking products SEGA
4 Personal care Personal care SAG1
5 Fuels, utilities, and public services Fuels and utilities SAH2
6 Household operations Household furnishings and operations SAH3
7 Public transportation Public transportation SETG
8 Gasoline and motor oil Motor fuels SETB
9 Apparel Apparel SAA
10 Education Tuition expenditures SEEB
11 Reading Recreational reading material SERG
12 Health services Medical care SAM
13 Miscellaneous expenditures




15 Household equipment Household furnishings and operations SAH3
16 Other lodging expenses
d Shelter SAH1
17 Other vehicle expenses
e Car maintenance and repair SETD
18 Rented dwellings Rent of primary residence SEHA
19 Owned dwellings Shelter SAH1
20 Purchases of vehicles Purchase of new vehicles SETA01
Imputed Services
21 Services from owned primary residence Rent of primary residence SEHA
22 Services from vehicles Purchase of new vehicles SETA01
a CPI are monthly average city data for all urban consumers, not seasonally adjusted, and are in base 1982–1984 = 100.
b Mostly fees for services such as banking or legal assistance.
c BLS CPI for entertainment ends in 1998. We extend it to 2004 using the CPI for recreation (SAR).
d Includes mostly expenditures on vacation homes.
e Includes expenditures on maintenance, repairs, insurance, and finance charges.
BLS CPI CodeTable A2. Summary Statistics for the Benchmark Sample
Year Households Average Income
LEA+ ND ND+
1980 638 15736 7447 12940
1981 1439 15419 7348 12875
1982 1313 16453 6949 12605
1983 1700 16746 7134 12873
1984 1771 18017 7398 13495
1985 1267 17862 7323 13463
1986 748 18678 7308 13725
1987 1840 19318 7558 13992
1988 1621 18881 7391 13752
1989 1762 19585 7517 14183
1990 1789 18893 7455 14171
1991 1749 19170 7376 13858
1992 1725 19046 7126 13737
1993 1786 18841 7115 13686
1994 1744 18657 7114 13498
1995 1325 19269 7127 13865
1996 881 20203 7433 14674
1997 1609 20557 7203 14204
1998 1578 20952 7323 14689
1999 1763 22060 7263 14532
2000 2164 21508 7191 14508
2001 2227 21468 6967 14060
2002 2387 23427 7280 14766
2003 2593 22544 7053 14359
Note: Income and consumption measures are in 1982–1984 constant dollars per adult equivalent. 
Averages are weighted using CE population weights. A household belongs to year x if
its fifth interview is between the second quarter of year x and the first quarter of year x+1.






Figure 1. The Evolution of Income and Consumption Inequality in the United States, 1980-2003
Gini Index























ND+ Consumption LEA+ Income 2SE Bands
Note: The standard errors are computed using a bootstrap procedure with 100 repetitions












































































































































































Note: The solid lines are the time series of  the cross-sectional variances estimated in the data. The dashed lines (which are the solid lines HP filtered) 
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